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Lord Denning‘s assessment of Magna Carta at its 750th anniversary 
has stood the test of half a century: ―the greatest constitutional document 
of all times—the foundation of the freedom of the individual against the 
arbitrary authority of the despot‖.1 His longer, but still succinct, article for 
The Times for the same anniversary has not been bettered.
2
 Yet at the time 
of Magna Carta‘s 800th anniversary we have lost sight of two other works 
of Lord Denning which could make a distinctive contribution to our 
current constitutional debates. Whereas Lord Neuberger has linked the 
real Magna Carta to the fictitious Holy Grail in an entertaining lecture
3
 on 
law and myth, for legal scholars the Holy Grail is a long lost text or case. 
An earlier essay
4
 identified the links between the opening clause of Magna 
Carta 1215 and s 13 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as worthy of 
rediscovery. This article presents two further candidates: a neglected 
lecture on Borrowing from Scotland
5
 by Lord Denning in 1961 and a 
neglected Court of Appeal decision in 1975 applying Magna Carta, in 
which Lord Denning presided as Master of the Rolls, R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Office, ex p Phansopkar.
6
 Between them, they can 
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(Cambridge University Press 2015) 314-333. 
5
 Lord Denning, Borrowing from Scotland, 26
th
 David Murray Foundation 
Lecture, University of Glasgow, 5 May 1961, printed by Jackson, Son & Co, 
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offer refreshing insights into contemporary constitutional controversies.  
The main focus here, after drawing attention to the lecture on 
Borrowing from Scotland, is the Phansopkar case‘s use of Magna Carta. It 
is instructive to see how Magna Carta has been used in practice, between 
its 750
th
 and 800
th
 anniversaries and well ahead of the Human Rights Act 
1998. It is also salutary to consider some of those involved in the case, 
their earlier lives and what happened next. Finally, and briefly, I attempt 
to link these two seemingly disparate parts of Lord Denning‘s legacy. 
There is no mention of Magna Carta in the lecture and no mention of 
Scotland in the Magna Carta case (or in Magna Carta itself because it was, 
of course, a foreign country at the time) but forging connections between 
them is a way of drawing lessons for our wider constitutional 
controversies.   
In 2015, the 800
th
 anniversary of Magna Carta coincides with a new 
Conservative government in Westminster pledging to ―control 
immigration‖ and proposing three significant constitutional changes 
which were in its manifesto: English votes for English laws, in the 
aftermath of the 2014 referendum rejecting independence for Scotland; a 
second referendum on membership of the European Union, the first 
having been in 1975; and a British Bill of Rights to replace the Human 
Rights Act 1998.
7
 The last of these is already proving problematic and has 
been delayed, with no commitment on timing in the Queen‘s Speech.8 One 
common theme is the desirability, or undesirability, of external influences 
on the legal system of England and Wales, whether from Scotland or 
Brussels or Luxembourg or Strasbourg. Through various 
misunderstandings, the different concerns have been conflated into a 
distrust of ―European‖ judges or other law-makers from outside this legal 
system. Supporters of the European Convention and its incorporation have 
not helped. The 1997-2001 Labour government promoted the Human 
Rights Act under the slogan Bringing Rights Home and then Rights 
                                                     
7
 https://www.conservatives.com/Manifesto. 
8
 Contrast the detail in the Queen‘s Speech of the first two with the third: 
My Government will bring forward changes to the Standing Orders of the House 
of Commons. These changes will create fairer procedures to ensure that decisions 
affecting England, or England and Wales, can be taken only with the consent of 
the majority of Members of Parliament representing constituencies in those parts 
of our United Kingdom. My Government will renegotiate the United Kingdom‘s 
relationship with the European Union and pursue reform of the European Union 
for the benefit of all Member States. Alongside this, early legislation will be 
introduced to provide for an in-out referendum on membership of the European 
Union before the end of 2017 [EU Referendum Bill]… My Government will 
bring forward proposals for a British Bill of Rights. 
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Brought Home)  as if it were a good thing for rights to be ―at home‖, as if 
rights were not at home from 1215 and as if rights were now not to be 
resolved on the Continent. Now the Conservative government is trying 
both to ―scrap‖ the Human Rights Act and to rely on much the same 
argument (note the title of a think tank report, Rights Brought Back 
Home
9
) that we should bring rights home into a British Bill of Rights. Yet 
the erstwhile supporters of that very process have become so attached to 
the Human Rights Act 1998 that they are now vehemently against 
whatever it is that the government thinks it will achieve for (or against) 
human rights.   
 Whether or not the past can be deemed a foreign country10 for these 
purposes, it is similarly instructive to question whether there is and should 
be a place in the contemporary constitution for Magna Carta, not just as a 
part of what Walter Bagehot called the ―dignified‖ constitution but also as 
a working part of the ―efficient‖ constitution. Bagehot did not dwell on 
Magna Carta in his own book on The English Constitution.
11
 Neither did 
RFV Heuston mention Magna Carta in his Essays on Constitutional 
Law.
12
 Leo Amery‘s Thoughts on the Constitution13 did not involve many 
thoughts on Magna Carta, merely passing mentions. Will Magna Carta be 
forgotten once the 800
th
 anniversary celebrations are over, only to 
languish until its 900
th
 and 1000
th
 anniversaries? Or can its renewed 
application, whether in its own right or as part of a new British Bill of 
Rights, be a fitting legacy from the mass of lectures, exhibitions and other 
events this year?   
Compared to Bagehot‘s dignified language about the dignified 
constitution, Lord Sumption, an historian turned lawyer and now a 
Supreme Court Justice, has been blunt about over-exuberant celebrations 
of Magna Carta by lawyers in the run-up to the 800
th
 anniversary.
14
 He 
dismisses pious praise of Magna Carta as ―high-minded tosh‖ and is 
scathing about relying for the Rule of Law on rich barons: ―Do we need to 
                                                     
9
 See also the foreword by Lord Hoffmann to a report for the independent think 
tank Policy Exchange http://conservativehome.blogs.com/files/px-bringing-
rights-back-home.pdf 
10
 LP Hartley, The Go-Between (Penguin 1953): the opening sentence reads: ‗The 
past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.‘ 
11
 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (Oxford 2001). 
12
 RFV Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law (London Stevens and Sons Ltd 
1961). 
13
 Leo Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution (OUP 1947). 
14
 Lord Sumption, ‗Magna Carta Then and Now‘, address to the Friends of the 
British Library, 9 March 2015, https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
150309.pdf 
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derive our belief in democracy and the rule of law from a group of 
muscular conservative millionaires from the north of England, who 
thought in French, knew no Latin or English, and died more than three 
quarters of a millennium ago? I rather hope not.‖ This could be described 
as a bit rich from someone whose own robust approach could itself count 
as ―muscular‖15 and ―conservative‖16 and whose success at the Bar has 
been widely reported to have made him a millionaire,
17
 albeit not one 
from the north. 
Lord Sumption could not possibly have been criticising Lord 
Neuberger‘s lecture18 on Magna Carta and the Holy Grail because that 
came later and indeed praises Lord Sumption‘s analysis. The President of 
the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, tells us he was ―somewhat taken 
aback‖ to be told, by his judicial assistant,19 that the rapper Jay Z has an 
album with Magna Carta in its title (Magna Carta Holy Grail). He 
confessed to not understanding why the album title referred to Magna 
Carta: ―Listening to the music, digesting the lyrics, and reading its 
Wikipedia entry leave me little wiser as to why the album has the title that 
it does, but I suppose that when it comes to subtle allusions, rap-singers 
may have it over judges.‖ Quite so. This could be a metaphor for our 
times, that whilst judges know who The Beatles were,
20
 they think they 
                                                     
15
 On his muscular approach as a QC, see various accounts of his actions when 
representing the Foreign Office, writing to Lord Neuberger to press for a 
paragraph in a judgment to be redacted, eg 
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/10/binyam-mohamed-torture-
annotated-letter. 
16
 On his conservative approach to judging, see Sir Stephen Sedley‘s scathing 
critique of Lord Sumption‘s critique of Sir Stephen Sedley and other more 
radical, activist judges, ‗Judicial Politics‘, London Review of Books 23 February 
2012, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n04/stephen-sedley/judicial-politics. 
17
 The Daily Telegraph estimated his earnings at the Bar as £2m pa 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/7207378/Profile-of-QC-
at-centre-of-Binyam-case.html, The Daily Mail at £3m pa 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1263225/Binyam-Mohamed-legal-
torture-case-cost-taxpayers-750-000.html and The Sunday Times at £8m for one 
case. www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Society/article1121765.ece. 
18
 Lord Neuberger (n 3). 
19
 Hugh Comber (n 3). 
20
 The legal journalist Marcel Berlins doubts that any judge really asked this, or 
did not know, even if the same newspaper attributes it in its obituary columns to 
Judge James Pickles, without citing a particular occasion. See 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/may/21/uk.law  
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/dec/22/judge-james-pickles-dies 
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can also understand modern music (or law) by listening and staring at 
accompanying texts without appreciating context, subtext and underlying 
culture. Lord Neuberger gives no hint of having grasped that Jay Z‘s real 
surname is Carter and that the music millionaire formerly known as 
Shawn Carter was having fun in praise of himself (Great Carter, get it?). 
21
 
More seriously, there is something lacking in Lord Neuberger‘s 
approach in his lecture to assessing the importance of Magna Carta in 
modern courts. Despite having been one of Lord Denning‘s successors as 
Master of the Rolls, Lord Neuberger ignored the Court of Appeal in 
considering the impact of the 1215 Charter by just searching the on-line 
database Bailii for House of Lords or Supreme Court decisions which 
mentioned Magna Carta in the last 120 years, finding only ten.
22
 He thus 
missed the case which I have in mind as a way of commemorating Magna 
Carta and which merits consideration of how it might be applied in years 
to come, R v Secretary of State for the Home Office, ex p Phansopkar 
from 1975. So far Bailii is comprehensive below our highest court only 
from 1996, only featuring earlier Court of Appeal judgments if attention is 
drawn to a landmark decision. Phansopkar deserves that accolade.  
The Supreme Court Justices lecturing on Magna Carta
23
 have not 
mentioned this Phansopkar case. More generally, they and others have 
been lecturing on the wider constitution
24
 and even the Union
25
 without 
addressing the lecture by Lord Denning. The danger of anyone offering an 
alternative view on Magna Carta is, as Lord Sumption claimed, that ―It is 
impossible to say anything new about Magna Carta unless it is mad.‖26 
Even then, he suspects someone else will have said it. I have already 
offered a different perspective on Magna Carta. Although dismissed as 
peripheral, s 13 of the Human Rights Act 1998 is an extended version of 
Magna Carta‘s first clause on freedom of religion.27 Section 13 is now 
being mentioned as significant in the government‘s deliberations on its 
manifesto commitment to replace the Human Rights Act with a British 
                                                     
21
 Lee (n 4) 320.  
22
 Neuberger (n 3). 
23
 Neuberger (n 3) and Sumption (n 14). 
24
 Neuberger, Hale https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-150205.pdf Reed 
http://www.innertemple.org.uk/downloads/members/lectures_2013/lecture_reed_
2013.pdf 
25
 Most egregiously, Lord Sumption, even when giving a lecture to the Denning 
Society on This Disunited Kingdom: England, Ireland and Scotland, 5 November 
2013, https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-131105.pdf  
26
 Sumption (n 14). 
27
 Lee (n 4). 
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Bill of Rights. It only takes the same will to rehabilitate both the idea of 
Borrowing from Scotland and the Court of Appeal‘s example of using 
Magna Carta. 
 
THEY COME OVER HERE … (PART ONE) 
 
Fear, dislike and distrust of the other is not confined to contemporary 
debates on immigration or Unions. A disrespectful phrase has become a 
sinister by-word for prejudice: ―They come over here, taking our …‖ 
(jobs, houses, and so on). So of whom was it said, and when was it said, 
that, ―They have pounced upon us, like swarms of locusts, into every 
quarter and every scene of life … And when there is anything to be got, 
you may be sure to find a number…conven‘d, like Hounds over a Carrion: 
or flies in the shambles‖?28 
Lord Denning had a more flowing way of talking about the influence 
of European law as an incoming tide
29
but those who think of him as a 
―Little Englander‖ who might have made this remark in the last century 
are wide of the mark. The people being attacked by the English press in 
this instance were the Scots in 1746. In particular, the rumour was that a 
Scot called William Murray was going to be made a judge in England. 
Lord Denning, in an outstanding but neglected lecture, does us a service 
by reporting this xenophobia and the lawyer‘s response to his critics, 
which was to point out anonymously that if they did not like the Scots, 
then the easy remedy would be to repeal the Act of Union of 1707. This 
lawyer from Scotland did indeed become a judge and then, ten years later, 
William Murray became the Lord Chief Justice of England, taking the title 
Lord Mansfield. For 32 years, he held that high office with the utmost 
distinction. He is especially praised on either side of the Atlantic for the 
release of a slave in the Somersett
30
 case and for recognising the right to 
free speech in the John Wilkes case.
31
Despite not mentioning Magna 
Carta in either, Lord Mansfield has come to represent the spirit of Magna 
Carta as the archetypal English judge, fiercely independent, championing 
the cause of freedom under the law. Yet he was born at Scone and in 
many ways, even though he left Scotland at the age of 14, he applied 
Scottish thinking and law in his English setting. This is explained in the 
substance of Lord Denning‘s lecture. He records Lord Mansfield‘s 
admiration of Scottish writers on law in Stair, Mackenzie and Craig. Then 
                                                     
28
 Denning (n 5) 7. 
29
 Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] Ch 401. 
30
 Somersett‘s case (1771) 20 State Trials 1-82, quoted at 16.  
31
 R v Wilkes (1768) 98 ER 327, 347. 
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he pays tribute to Lord Mansfield‘s following of Scottish law in 
commercial matters, focusing on principles.
32
 Next he singles out for 
praise Lord Mansfield‘s development of the action for unjust enrichment, 
aligning law and equity, following Roman Law and Scots law.
33
 Finally, 
Lord Denning praises Lord Mansfield for doing ―his best to bring the 
English law into line with Scots law‖34 in contract, whether or not there 
was consideration. It will not have escaped those familiar with Lord 
Denning‘s jurisprudence that Lord Mansfield is being lauded in all these 
respects for having anticipated how Lord Denning would have liked the 
law to have developed. Where Lord Mansfield was thwarted, as with 
contract, Lord Denning would ―very much like to see the English take a 
leaf out of Scotland‘s book‖.35 And where Lord Mansfield was criticized, 
as by Lord Redesdale who thought ―Lord Mansfield had in his mind 
prejudices derived from his familiarity with the Scots law‖,36 Lord 
Denning believes that ―time has shown that these criticisms were not 
merited‖.37     
Admittedly, there is a difference between judicial decision-making 
(including some development of the law) and elected law-making. 
Nevertheless, at least a judicious judicial Scottish vote for English laws 
can be wholly admirable.  
Lord Denning might not be the most obvious candidate as a cheer-
leader for Scottish judges in the English legal system. If we continue to 
ignore the lecture, of course, that assumption will prevail. But why did 
Lord Denning choose this topic at that time? Presumably, he was asked to 
give a prestigious lecture and chose a theme which would have appealed 
to his audience in Scotland. It also played to his own interest in great 
judges and history. Above all, however, Lord Denning saw himself as an 
outsider to the English legal establishment, a grammar school
38
 boy with a 
distinctive Hampshire burr of an accent, and was well disposed to others 
of similar talent who brought something different to our courts. Lord 
Mansfield came from a much more privileged background but he 
                                                     
32
 Denning (n 5) 10. 
33
 Eg Moses v Macfarlen (1760) 2 Burrow at 1012, cited by Lord Denning (n 5) 
12. 
34
 Denning (n 5) 13. 
35
 Ibid 15. 
36
 Ibid 12. 
37
 Ibid 3. 
38
 See Lee, ‗Lord Denning, Margaret Thatcher, Law and Society‘ (2013) 25 The 
Denning Law Journal 159, 160: ‗Both rose to high office from humble beginnings 
above family shops‘. 
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succeeded as an outsider to the extent that he was from Scotland and had 
endured that unwelcoming press on rumours of his judicial appointment. 
The next great ―English‖ legal figure admired by Lord Denning in this 
lecture was Thomas Erskine, another Scot, who was born in Edinburgh in 
1750. He is renowned for his emphasis on the independence of the Bar 
and for his defence of freedom of speech.
39
 A powerful advocate, he 
became Lord Chancellor. Then came John Campbell, born in 1781 in 
Fifeshire, who became Attorney-General, Lord Chief Justice and Lord 
Chancellor. On his appointment as Lord Chancellor, he recommended 
Colin Blackburn to replace him on the Queen‘s Bench. Blackburn was 
born in 1813 in Dunbartonshire Lord Denning notes that The Times was 
unimpressed: ―Who is Mr Colin Blackburn?‖ The only explanation 
entertained by The Times for this ―freak‖ appointment was that he was 
another ―Scotchman‖.40 According to Lord Denning, however, ―Colin 
Blackburn was the greatest lawyer of the nineteenth century‖.41 Many a 
student even in the twenty-first century knows, or at least knows of, his 
judgment in Rylands v Fletcher.
42
 
Lord Denning continues in this vein when it comes to the twentieth 
century, full of praise for the influence on English law of one Scottish 
judge after another. Scottish Lord Chancellors of the twentieth century ran 
from Lord Loreburn through Viscount Kilmuir at the time of Lord 
Denning‘s lecture (and on to Lord Mackay and Lord Irvine later in the 
century). Two of the judges in Donoghue v Stevenson were Scottish, 
Lords Thankerton and Macmillan,
43
 both agreeing with Lord Atkin to 
form the majority for his famous judgment on the law of negligence. If 
Lord Denning himself has a rival for the title of our greatest judge in that 
century, it might be Scotland‘s Lord Reid.44 
In sum, Lord Denning‘s sparkling lecture shows that we have had at 
least three hundred years of Scottish judges developing and illuminating 
English law. It is therefore perplexing that there is such outrage at Scottish 
                                                     
39
 See Lord Neuberger, Lord Erskine and Trial by Jury, 2012, 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-121018.pdf 
40
 Denning (n 5) 32. 
41
 Denning (n 5) 32. 
42
 Rylands v Fletcher (1865) LR 1, Ex 265, LR3 HL 330. 
43
 Denning (n 5) 35, commenting on Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 AC 562. See 
Alan Rodger, ‗Lord Macmillan‘s Speech in Donoghue v Stevenson‘ (1992) 108 
LQR 236. 
44
 Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (Macmillan 1982). See also Louis Blom-
Cooper, ‗The European Convention in an International Legal Setting‘ [1997] 
EHRLR 508. 
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law-makers in Parliament continuing to exercise the practice of three 
centuries in voting on the outcome of laws confined to England or to 
England and Wales. Unless, that is, there is something wholly different 
about judicial and elected law-making. But if there is and it remains 
acceptable for Scots to make judicial decisions in English law, then it is 
not so obvious why it would be so wrong for non-English judges 
elsewhere in Europe to offer their insights into human rights in the legal 
system of England and Wales.  
Whatever the explanations might be, the fact remains that Scottish 
judges have long since made invaluable contributions to the law south of 
the border. The quintessential English judge, Lord Denning, spotted this 
and used his famous story-telling powers to give a lecture that is in a class 
of its own.   
The lecture is not beyond criticism. Its last two sentences
45
 jump to a 
conclusion that is not justified by the argument. In expressing the hope 
that the two legal systems might eventually become one, Lord Denning 
undid some of his good work in recounting the history of Scots lawyers 
rising to high judicial office south of the border. On the contrary, an 
attraction of the lecture and of the Union is the value of diversity, of 
constitutional laboratories within one state.
46
 Overall, however, this is a 
first class lecture which still has the power to surprise lawyers who do not 
know the biographies of famous judges of earlier centuries. Omitting the 
second part of the penultimate sentence and the whole of the final 
sentence, it would have reached this resounding conclusion, saying of 
Lord Kilmuir (who was then the Lord Chancellor and had previously been 
central to the drafting of the European Convention)
47
 that, ―He is the latest 
of the many men of high principle and great endeavour who have come 
from Scotland to England and have enriched the law of these Islands. This 
process is much to be encouraged – England borrowing men and 
principles from Scotland for the benefit of both‖.48 Who knows whether 
this lecture in May 1961 had any effect on Lord Kilmuir‘s 
recommendation less than a year later that Lord Denning should become 
the Master of the Rolls? More importantly, does the thrust of this lecture 
have an application in our own time? To this we shall return after the main 
                                                     
45
 Denning (n 5) 39-40. 
46
 Smith Commission https://www.smith-commission.scot/. 
47
 Neil Duxbury, Lord Kilmuir: A Vignette (Hart 2015). 
48
 Denning (n 5) 39. Lord Denning was speaking at a time when it was not 
customary to say men and women and when there had not been a woman 
appellate judge in either legal system. We still await the first woman Supreme 
Court Justice from Scotland.  
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body of this article looks at the ramifications of a rare Court of Appeal 
decision citing Magna Carta.  
 
THEY COME OVER HERE … (PART TWO) 
 
In R v Home Secretary, ex p Phansopkar,
49
 a strong Court of Appeal 
ordered the Home Secretary to consider immigration claims in accordance 
with Magna Carta. 
The three judges in the Court of Appeal were three of the most well-
known members of the judiciary. Despite the ―Kilmuir Rules‖, named 
after the afore-mentioned Scottish Lord Chancellor who feared that too 
frequent appearances in the media by judges posed difficulties for their 
independence, Lord Denning, Sir Frederick Lawton and Sir Leslie 
Scarman revelled in their extra-judicial engagements in the public square. 
Six months before this case, in December 1974, Sir Leslie Scarman had 
given his famous Hamlyn Lectures on English Law – The New 
Dimension.
50
 In February 1975, one of Sir Frederick Lawton‘s former 
pupils became leader of the Conservative Party. Margaret Thatcher went 
on to praise her pupil-master for his robust approach to the law, especially 
sentencing.
51
 In fact, Lord Justice Lawton‘s views on sentencing were 
nuanced. He did believe in long sentences for crimes of violence. But he 
is also credited for popularising the phrase ―short, sharp shock‖ for lesser 
offences. The phrase comes from Gilbert & Sullivan, The Mikado, but it 
was given a boost by Sir Frederick Lawton who liked to say that he had 
spent longer in prison than most hardened criminals, having grown up in 
prison as his father was a prison governor.
52
 The Court was not stacked 
for or against the government of the day. Lord Justice Lawton had been a 
candidate for a controversial right-wing party in his youth, having earlier 
flirted with the extreme Left,   but Lord Justice Scarman was widely 
regarded as one of the most liberal of our judges. Although the Left used 
Lord Justice Lawton‘s past right-wing politics to suggest that the judiciary 
might be biased against those less privileged in society,
53
 in this case all 
                                                     
49
 Phansopkar (n 6). 
50
 Sir Leslie Scarman, English Law – The New Dimension (Hamlyn Lectures, 
26th Series 1975). 
51
 Margaret Thatcher commenting on Sir Frederick Lawton 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107570.  
52
 Lawton – see obituaries 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1321260/Sir-Frederick-Lawton.html. 
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2001/feb/05/guardianobituaries1. 
53
 Paul Foot https://www.marxists.org/archive/foot-paul/1978/04/judges.htm. 
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three judges ruled in favour of vulnerable individuals seeking a ruling 
from the Home Secretary.  
Two appeals were heard together by the Court of Appeal on 30 June 
and 1 July against the Home Secretary, ex parte Phansopkar and ex parte 
Begum, usually reported as R v Home Secretary, ex p Phansopkar. Lord 
Widgery, sitting with Ashworth and May JJ, dismissed the case at first 
instance on 24 April but Phansopkar won on appeal. Lord Widgery, sitting 
this time with Bridge & Stocker JJ had then decided on May 22 that 
Begum was indistinguishable from Phansopkar. Although the appellate 
judges were not convinced there was a way of distinguishing the two 
cases, both were held by the Court of Appeal to be wrong on their merits. 
In the conjoined appeals, Lord Denning sitting as the Master of the Rolls, 
Lord Justice Lawton and Lord Justice Scarman all relied on Magna Carta. 
The timing of this case is also of interest in the light of the new 
Westminster government‘s promise of a second referendum on 
membership of the European Union before the end of 2017. The 
Phansopkar case came as that first referendum on staying in the European 
Community was being held in the summer of 1975. The Labour 
government was at the same time steering a bill through parliament to 
strengthen protection against sex discrimination. It was soon to do the 
same against race discrimination, extending the power or its pioneering 
1965 and 1968 Acts.. Its Home Secretary was Roy Jenkins. His special 
adviser was Anthony Lester QC. The Home Office‘s barrister in the Court 
of Appeal was Harry Woolf. It would be difficult to find three more 
celebrated characters in our modern history of protecting and promoting 
human rights. Yet the Home Office at the time of what could be described 
as its greatest glory in terms of progressive legislation was arguing that it 
was entitled to send Mrs Phansopkar and Mrs Begum back to India and 
Bangladesh respectively and it was the judges who ordered the Labour 
government to resolve the matter here in the UK.  
This case is too often ignored or overlooked or under-played. It is not 
mentioned in any of the Supreme Court Justices‘ Magna Carta lectures. In 
his leading judgment in M,
54
 Lord Woolf only refers to Phansopkar for a 
passing point (on which he gives the impression that it was a ruling 
requiring an immigration officer to consider the matter whereas the order 
of mandamus required the Home Secretary to make a decision). Ten days 
before the 800
th
 anniversary however, it does receive a passing mention 
from Mrs Justice Patterson in her ruling that the government had delayed 
                                                     
54
 M v Home Office, [1994] 1 AC 377. 
 http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1993/5.html. 
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unduly in providing disability benefit for C and W
55
. She notes that the 
case was cited but seems to take it as settled law, conceded by the 
defendants, that unreasonable delay is unlawful and so does not need to 
consider the detail of the case law. This is a pity because she later goes on 
to reject the Human Rights Act arguments that human rights have been 
breached. Lord Justice Lawton in Phansopkar, however, was clear that 
fundamental human rights were at stake with corresponding duties and 
that those duties not to delay the vindication of rights were imposed on the 
executive by Magna Carta.
56
   
Where the case is mentioned in the academic literature, it is usually 
for Lord Scarman‘s reference to the European Convention, bolstered by 
the Magna Carta argument, even though Lord Denning MR and Lawton 
LJ did not rely on the European Convention whereas all three did invoke 
Magna Carta. Adam Tomkins thinks the Magna Carta references are 
merely obiter dicta.
57
 A more expansive or inclusive understanding of the 
ratio is, I would submit, more in keeping with the tenor of the judgments. 
Magna Carta was an ―aid to determining the issues in the case‖. After all, 
five different judges at first instance (Lord Widgery CJ sitting in both 
cases) had ruled against Mrs Phansopkar and Mrs Begum by looking at 
the statute and Rules without contemplating Magna Carta. Lord Widgery 
CJ, with whom the other judges agreed, did consider that the Act and 
Rules should be read subject to a common law duty but in his judgment 
that duty was to be fair between families queuing. It is because the three 
judges in the Court of Appeal recalled a prior duty under Magna Carta not 
to delay justice that they saw the matter differently. When in doubt about 
how general the level should be at which to cast the ratio of a case, we 
should let the judgments speak for themselves.  
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It is especially important to reconsider Phansopkar fully in Magna 
Carta‘s 800th anniversary year in case the Conservative government really 
does do anything approaching its manifesto pledge to ―scrap‖ the Human 
Rights Act.  
The facts of Phansopkar show that the strength of both Magna Carta 
and an ―external‖ perspective on human rights can act as an effective 
check on a well-intentioned government. The Prime Minister gives the 
impression of being furious with European Court of Human Rights judges 
for deciding in favour of prisoners and those suspected of terrorism, 
against the wishes of what he regards as well-intentioned governments of 
different political complexions focusing on the common good in an era of 
dangerous threats to security.
58
   
Why has the case been neglected?
59
 It might be that those pressing for 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights were 
embarrassed by the facts of the case. Or it could be that obscurity was 
caused by the headnote writers who did not include Magna Carta in their 
rendering of the holding.
60
 Or it might have slipped under the radar 
because it was difficult for judges sitting alongside Lord Denning to get 
much attention for what they said. Lawton LJ and Scarman LJ used the 
term ―Magna Carta‖ but Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, who had 
something of a grudge against Latin or at least against those who thought 
he had not mastered it or its pronunciation, called it the Great Charter.
61
 
Or it might be that immigration laws, rules and practices changed so 
frequently that the significance of the broader issues was lost. Or it could 
have been merely that there were so many cases to choose from in the 
mid-1970s that custom settled on such later gems from 1975 and 1976 as 
Congreve
62
 or Laker
63
 or Tameside,
64
 based on popular media coverage.  
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Avoiding an increase in TV licence fees,  liberalising trans-Atlantic travel 
and facilitating or inhibiting  (depending on one‘s view) school selection 
played better than vindicating rights of immigrants. Another way of 
putting that, however, is that immigration, mental health and other spheres 
where Magna Carta has been applied are Cinderella subjects. This is 
where fundamental
65
 constitutional provisions are especially valuable and 
where innovative argument might be needed. No cases were cited in 
argument or judgment in Phansopkar at first instance. Counsel understood 
the issues of rights under threat and of the rule of law. These Cinderella 
subjects are going to the ball much more in the Supreme Court era than in 
the time of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, partly because 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the surrounding culture. 
For whatever reason, when Ronald Dworkin had the whole of English 
or UK law from which to choose a case, he opted for a decision later in 
the same year by one of the same judges at first instance, Lord Widgery, 
in the Crossman Diaries case.
66
 He seemed to think that was decided in 
the House of Lords. Imagine if he had instead chosen R v Home Secretary, 
ex p Phansopkar, where there was a striking difference between the 
approach of Lord Widgery and the Court of Appeal. Apart from anything 
else, other scholars might also have paid more attention to this case if it 
had become subject to Dworkin‘s sweeping jurisprudential analysis.     
The substance of the disagreement between the Court of Appeal and 
the government on what is fair and reasonable could be put in terms of 
that ultimate British value of refraining from queue-jumping. In a learned 
article on queue-jumping,
67
 the property lawyer and property law theorist, 
Professor Kevin Gray, does not address Phansopkar. Those, like myself, 
who prefer the judgments of the Court of Appeal to the convenience of the 
Home Office might prefer a different term, and underlying British value, 
to queue-jumping, such as ―taking the initiative‖ or ―taking the matter into 
one‘s own hands‖ when faced with excessive bureaucratic delays.  
Sibghatullah Kadri appeared for Mrs Phansopkar, Harry Woolf for the 
respondents at first instance, Sibghatullah Kadri and Anthony Eton for 
Mrs Phansopkar, Eugene Cotran for Mrs Begum on appeal, Harry Woolf 
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for the respondents. No cases were cited at first instance and only two in 
the Court of Appeal, R v Northumberland Compensation Tribunal
68
 
(where Denning LJ sat as only the second senior judge) and R v Home 
Secretary, ex p Mughal,
69
 where S Kadri appeared before Denning MR 
and Scarman LJ, that time sitting with Megaw LJ, and where Gordon 
Slynn was for the government. In that case, Lord Denning drew a sharp 
distinction between the circumstances of Mr Mughal and of a ―patrial‖.  
Lord Widgery CJ, with whom Ashworth & May JJ agreed, explained 
that, “The Home Office came into this matter at quite an early stage 
because reference was made to them by a member of Parliament who was 
interesting himself in the situation of Mr Phansopkar and his alleged wife‖ 
and rejected the applications because ―it must be remembered that being 
fair is not simply being fair to one family. It is a question of being fair to 
all those who suffer from this problem, and the Home Secretary is entitled 
in my judgment to take the view that in order to be fair to all he should not 
allow one family, or one individual, to obtain priority in the queue by such 
means as are put forward in this case.‖70 
As always, Lord Denning MR set out the facts and legal background 
in a compelling fashion: 
 
The husband, Allimiya Bawa Phansopkar, was born in India … He 
has produced a marriage certificate issued in India which shows 
that in 1962, when he was 27, he married his wife, Maimuna, who 
was then 20. The marriage was solemnised at the bride‘s house by 
her father, in accordance with the Moslem religion. Their first 
child, a girl, was born in January 1964. Two years later, in 1966, 
the husband came to England and found work here; but he went 
back to India from time to time to join his wife, and they had there 
three more children, all boys, born in May 1968, September 1971 
and February 1974. Then in March 1974 the husband took a most 
important step. He became a citizen of this country; or, more 
accurately, a citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies…He 
himself thenceforward had ―the right of abode in the United 
Kingdom‖. His right was equal to the right of abode of any of us. 
You and I and our families have been born here and lived here 
from time immemorial. Yet Mr Phansopkar, from the moment he 
was registered, had just as much right here as we have. He became 
a citizen of no mean country. He could say proudly -- if he spoke 
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Latin -- civis angliae sum. He became a patrial. And not only he. 
His wife also obtained at that very moment the selfsame right… 
she was a Commonwealth citizen. And, as such, as soon as her 
husband, by registration, gained the right of abode in the United 
Kingdom, she acquired the selfsame right of abode … ―free to live 
in, and to come and go into and from, the United Kingdom 
without let or hindrance.‖71 
 
Yet when the Phansopkars tired of waiting in India, where the queue 
was long, and took action by flying to Heathrow, Mrs Phansopkar and the 
children were refused entry. The immigration officer required them to go 
back to India to secure a certificate of patriality. This made sense to the 
three judges at first instance but not to the three judges in the Court of 
Appeal. Lord Denning continued from his account of her right:
72
  
 
Such being her right, I do not think it can be taken away by 
arbitrarily refusing her a certificate, or by delaying to issue it to 
her without good cause. She can invoke the Great Charter: ―To 
none will we sell: to no one will we delay or deny right or justice.‖ 
It seems to me to be implicit in this legislation that a wife, who is 
truly a wife, is entitled to apply for a certificate of patriality and to 
have her application examined fairly and in a reasonable time.  
 
The Home Office gave no reason except that ―it is considered that 
[the] application can be most satisfactorily dealt with by the entry 
certificate officer at the British High Commission in‖ Bombay or Dacca 
respectively. Lord Denning asked, ―Was that a sufficient reason?‖ and 
answered no because
73
 
 
a wife who applies in Bombay or Dacca for a certificate of 
patriality has to join a long queue of those who require leave to 
enter. By the time she is granted an interview, 14 months or more 
will have passed. The delay was so long that these two ladies, at 
any rate, determined to test the matter by coming here and 
applying here. In the circumstances I think they were justified in 
so doing.‖  
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Lord Denning therefore ordered that,
74
 
 
The Home Secretary ought not to send these ladies back to India 
and Bangladesh to face the long delays. He ought to examine the 
applications to see whether or not each lady is a patrial, and to 
give or refuse a certificate according to whether she satisfies him, 
or not. 
 
Lawton LJ began by declaring in forthright terms the point that a right 
was at stake and that the Home Secretary was under a duty dating back to 
Magna Carta:
75
 
 
These appeals concern rights, not privilege. The rights are 
fundamental human rights -- of husbands and wives to live 
together.‖ The Home Secretary ―cannot refuse to consider the 
application; nor can he delay consideration unreasonably. These 
duties were imposed on the Crown and its servants by Magna 
Carta ... Administrative convenience, however well intentioned it 
may have been, cannot be made a justification for depriving 
people of their rights or for delaying consideration of their claims 
to rights… I would allow the appeal and order that the Secretary 
of State for Home Affairs shall consider and determine the 
applications for certificates of patriality made by both these 
appellants. 
 
Scarman LJ also took the matter seriously as a breach of rights which 
could be traced back to a ―hallowed principle of our law‖76 in Magna 
Carta, now reinforced by the European Convention:
77
  
 
The background to these two appeals is disturbing. We have been 
told by counsel for the Secretary of State that in 1974, 12,864 
entry certificates were granted by overseas offices in the Indian 
sub-continent and 859 certificates of patriality. It is significant that 
during the year not one application for a certificate of patriality 
was refused, though the applicants had to endure the wait in the 
queue for 14 months or more… Delay of this order appears to me 
to infringe at least two human rights recognised, and therefore 
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protected, by English law. Justice delayed is justice denied: ―We 
will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right‖: Magna 
Carta. This hallowed principle of our law is now reinforced by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 1950 to 
which it is now the duty of our public authorities in administering 
the law, including the Immigration Act 1971, and of our courts in 
interpreting and applying the law, including the Act, to have 
regard: see R v Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte 
Bhajan Singh in this court… It may, of course, happen under our 
law that the basic rights to justice undeferred and to respect for 
family and private life have to yield to express requirements of a 
statute. But in my judgment it is the duty of the courts, so long as 
they do not defy or disregard clear unequivocal provision, to 
construe statutes in a manner which promotes, not endangers, 
those rights. Problems of ambiguity or omission, if they arise 
under the language of an Act, should be resolved so as to give 
effect to, or at the very least so as not to derogate from, the rights 
recognised by Magna Carta and the European convention. 
 
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted but no appeal was 
pursued. The ratio of the case could be put at various levels of generality. 
All three judges, however, framed the case in terms of Magna Carta, both 
because of its longevity and because of its fundamental nature. All three 
interpreted the common law as reading into the Immigration Act and 
Rules that the Home Secretary‘s actions are subject to Magna Carta, now 
for Lord Justice Scarman reinforced by the European Convention. 
Scarman LJ accepts that express provision in a statute could restrict the 
reach of Magna Carta and the Convention. It might have been thought 
implausible, however, that a political party would want to push through 
Parliament legislation which spelled out that its ministers were to have an 
exemption from Magna Carta. It is now just about possible that the current 
government has in mind the equivalent of ―Notwithstanding any provision 
to the contrary in the Human Rights Act‖ but restricting the ambit of a 
statute of 17 years is not comparable to acting contrary to Magna Carta‘s 
800 years of imposing duties on those in government. But he is clear that 
without an express counter, the statute must be construed so as to conform 
to duties under Magna Carta.  
The facts of Phansopkar are most relevant to that contentious issue in 
contemporary politics of immigration, even though the significance of the 
case goes way beyond this context in speaking to us today. Commentators 
who might describe themselves as liberal- or Left-leaning criticise 
Conservative ministers and media for seeking to demonise immigrants 
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and to deter or at least delay their entry into the UK. In its broadest 
application, the case has been cited in the very month of Magna Carta‘s 
800
th
 anniversary by Mrs Justice Patterson in a ruling on unreasonable 
delays in disability benefits. Phansopkar itself, however, was a decision in 
favour of women from India and Bangladesh against a Labour 
government which prided itself on its attitudes to equality on grounds of 
race and gender.  
Indeed, it is worth recalling that three legendary figures in our human 
rights history were, in a sense, on the losing side of this case. Roy Jenkins 
was the Home Secretary held to be in breach of Magna Carta, Anthony 
Lester QC was his special adviser (although I do not mean to suggest that 
he would have advised on individual cases) and Harry Woolf was the 
counsel for the Home Office, trying to defend the Labour government‘s 
attempt to send Mrs Phansopkar and Mrs Begum back to queues in India 
and Bangladesh respectively, rather than resolve their claims where they 
were. I say ―in a sense‖ because no doubt the special adviser was busy 
drafting the famous laws against race and sex discrimination and was 
unaware of the Phansopkar case. Likewise, Harry Woolf was briefed to 
argue for the Home Office, not to offer his own opinion on the merits of 
this particular immigration claim. It may even be that Roy Jenkins was too 
busy on policy questions to focus on the legal or political ramifications of 
his great department of state seeking to deport Mrs Phansopkar. In any 
event, the Home Office was roundly defeated on appeal.  
Lord Justice Scarman had some sympathy for the Home Secretary: 
―One final word. This is not a case of an unthinking, heartless exercise of 
administrative power. The Secretary of State is clearly, and rightly, 
troubled by that queue.‖78 This aspect of Phansopkar is worth belabouring 
(be-Labouring) because it shows that with the best of intentions, a 
government which prides itself on human rights can be held to have erred. 
The current debate is as if the Conservative government‘s self-proclaimed 
good intentions of, for example, protecting national security are enough to 
render otiose recourse elsewhere. But Phansopkar shows that this is not 
so. Turning this the other way round, when a government is defeated on 
such grounds, perhaps opponents should not crow so much as if the 
government was therefore acting in bad faith. Perhaps this is the root of 
Conservative dissatisfaction with being upbraided by European or 
domestic judges.  
So what became of some of the principal characters involved in this 
litigation? The Home Secretary soon became President of the European 
Commission and later Lord Jenkins of Hillhead. Anthony Lester became 
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Lord Lester, much involved in the movement to incorporate the European 
Convention into British law. Harry Woolf became Lord Woolf, Master of 
the Rolls and then Lord Chief Justice. 
It is clear from the official law reports that counsel for Mrs 
Phansopkar raised the issue of the European Convention and a claim of 
habeas corpus but the reports are silent on whether counsel themselves 
invoked Magna Carta. Counsel for the Home Secretary responded to the 
Convention point in raised by counsel for Mrs Begum so presumably 
would have replied on Magna Carta if that had been raised explicitly. 
Whether counsel invoked Magna Carta or whether the formidable Bench 
saw the point was implicit in initial arguments, Sibghat (or Sibgatullah or 
Sib) Kadri and Eugene Cotran deserve credit for winning their cases and 
for the way in which they were won, with a so far unfulfilled potential to 
safeguard fundamental rights. Just as the stream of judges from Scotland 
have brought refreshingly different perspectives to English law, counsel 
for Mrs Phansopkar had the distinctive experience of having himself been 
detained without trial, contrary to Magna Carta, in another part of the 
Commonwealth. Both counsel for Mrs Phansopkar and for Mrs Begum 
knew what it was to come to the UK from a troubled part of the world. 
Even if they did not invoke Magna Carta explicitly, they might well have 
led the judges to think of it for themselves. 
Sibghat Kadri
79
 was born in India in 1937, migrating to Pakistan soon 
after partition in 1947. He was active in student politics at Karachi 
University where he was arrested and imprisoned without trial for 
opposing the military regime in 1958. He drafted his own petition for 
habeas corpus and secured his own release but was deported to Hyderabad 
in 1959. He came to England in 1960. He remained active in Pakistan 
politics in England and worked for the BBC as a producer and broadcaster 
in Urdu and in English.  He was called to the Bar in 1969. After pupillage, 
he formed his own set of chambers and then, with Rudy Narayan the 
Afro-Asian and Caribbean Law Association which became the Society of 
Black Lawyers. He became Queen‘s Counsel in 1989 and a Bencher of 
the Inner Temple in 1997. Over decades he has consistently challenged 
discriminatory practices and comments in the legal profession, saying 
that, ―Even Lord Denning, as brilliant as he was then, was not colour 
blind‖, and later successfully calling for Lord Denning‘s resignation over 
the publication of his book criticising jurors in the Bristol riot case.    
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Eugene Cotran,
80
 the lawyer for the other appellant, Mrs Begum, had 
been born in Jerusalem. He was a refugee who went to school in 
Alexandria and then studied law at the universities of Leeds and 
Cambridge. He was stateless before becoming a British citizen. After 
working in academe and legal practice in London, he became a High 
Court judge in Kenya before returning to the UK to practise as a barrister 
and to resume academic work at SOAS. He became the first Arab and 
Palestinian circuit judge. He was a Greek Orthodox Christian who had a 
lifelong interest in the law surrounding the Palestinian cause, including a 
prominent role in drafting its Basic Law. He died in the summer of 2014. 
The law report‘s summary of his argument before the Court of Appeal 
suggests that he had convinced Lord Justice Lawton who began his 
judgment in strikingly similar terms, that the cases concerned a right, not a 
privilege.  
One of the Phansopkar children, Nawaz, his wife and their children 
fled their flat above a grocer‘s shop when it was being destroyed by fire 
during the Croydon riots of 2011.
81
 Indeed, it was press coverage of this 
tragedy, linking the name of Phansopkar and the location of Croydon 
(where Mr & Mrs Phansopkar went through an English marriage 
ceremony, for the avoidance of doubt, before the hearing), which led to 
me recalling this case.
82
  
 
WHAT SAY THE REEDS AT RUNNYMEDE? 
 
Is there any link between the lecture on Borrowing from Scotland and 
this case applying Magna Carta? My contention is that there is a common 
element. It is a culture of magnanimity, of big-heartedness and openness 
towards different ways of looking at the law and society, sometimes from 
the past, sometimes from current circumstances, sometimes from afar, 
sometimes from nearby. 
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Louis Blom-Cooper
83
 speculated on what might have been if the 
Scottish law lord, Lord Reid, whom he described as ―the greatest judge of 
our times‖ had lived a little longer and if Phansopkar and two other cases 
from the Court of Appeal had gone on appeal to the Judicial Committee of 
the House of Lords: ―One can surmise that, had Lord Reid been given the 
opportunity to consider the jurisprudence developing in the Court of 
Appeal in and around 1975/1976, he would have affirmed the trilogy of 
1975 cases
84
 and applied international legal norms … (Lord Reid retired 
on January 10, 1975 and died on March 29, 1975.)‖   
One of our current Supreme Court Justices from Scotland, Lord Reed, 
has given a most insightful lecture
85
 on domestic legal systems and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, pointing out that France and 
Germany do not have the same exaggerated deference to Strasbourg 
decisions as has been implied in the British constitutional debate. He has 
argued for the resilience and ingenuity of the common law in finding 
imaginative ways to develop itself rather than simply deferring to 
Strasbourg, pointing out that this is necessary if we are to continue to offer 
a good example to the rest of the world in respecting the rule of law. This 
could be said to be a fall-back position in case the Human Rights Act is 
scrapped and nothing much replaces it on the statute book. More 
positively, it can be taken at face value as endorsing the approach adopted 
in Phansopkar (although again this case is not cited).   
Many of the lawyers who have argued or decided human rights cases 
have come from different legal and political systems, such as Sydney 
Kentridge QC, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Steyn from South Africa.
86
 The 
Hong Kong final court has even built this into its practice by including a 
wide range of judges from outside its own legal system. The experiences 
and courage of Sibghat Kadri and Eugene Cotran deserve a place in this 
company. In the case of Mr Kadri, for example, he showed ingenuity 
before he even studied law in securing his own release under martial law 
through habeas corpus. In Phansopkar, he called the Home Office to 
account, thanks to the Master of the Rolls and colleagues applying Magna 
Carta, and then later he called the Master of the Rolls himself to account. 
                                                     
83
 Blom-Cooper (n 44). 
84
 Phansopkar, Birdi v Home Secretary [1975] SJ 322, R v Home Secretary, ex p 
Bhajan Singh [1976] QB 198. 
85
Lord Reed 
http://www.innertemple.org.uk/downloads/members/lectures_2013/lecture_reed_
2013.pdf. 
86
 See eg Sydney Kentridge, Free Country (Hart 2012) or ‗Desert Island Discs‘ 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01rl0z9. 
LORD DENNING, MAGNA CARTA & MAGNANIMITY 
 
 
128 
As for Eugene Cotran, he saw himself as a Palestinian refugee and went 
on to be a judge in two legal systems in two continents, in Kenya and in 
England. His father Michel Cotran, incidentally, had the same distinction, 
having been Chief Registrar of the Judiciary in Jerusalem under the 
British Mandate, then becoming a refugee in Egypt before becoming a 
judge in Nigeria and then Chief Justice of West Cameroon.
87
 
This is not to say there is no merit in English votes for English laws in 
the different law-making realm of elected politicians deciding on statutes. 
But neither is it especially Conservative to ignore a long history of 
insights from across the Border. Borrowing from Scotland points us in the 
direction of magnanimity and wisdom in continuing to draw on Scottish 
judges, even if a more federal UK is the answer to the West Lothian 
question or even if Scotland were to become independent. The UK 
Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction in Scottish criminal law, unless 
there are human rights arguments, in which case the Scottish judges will 
be in a minority.  
Lord Denning ended his article in The Times on Magna Carta‘s 750th 
anniversary with a quotation from Rudyard Kipling‘s poem, What Say the 
Reeds at Runnymede?
88
 Although prone to go beyond the bare facts to 
give some colour to a case, none of the judges in Phansopkar mentioned 
how close the scene of the immigration officers‘ refusals was to 
Runnymede, where Magna Carta was sealed in 1215. Heathrow is only a 
few miles away.  
Lord Reed is yet to turn his attention to Magna Carta but for these 
purposes the Reeds (to include the Reids) are those judges with 
experience of another legal system in these islands
89
 and of legal systems 
on the Continent or those lawyers with a similar spirit of openness to 
diverse influences. Borrowing from Scotland and following Phansopkar 
are two paths 
90
 towards the same Holy Grail of a legal system open to 
different ways of challenging conventional wisdom at the behest of 
                                                     
87
 https://archive.is/mkUM1. 
88
 Rudyard Kipling, The Reeds of Runnymede (Magna Charta, June 15, 1215). 
89
 For a different example, see J Lee and S Lee, ‗Humility in the Supreme Court‘ 
(2015) 26 King‘s Law Journal 165, pointing out that Lord Kerr, the lone dissenter 
in R (on Application by Lord Carlile QC and others) v Home Secretary [2014] 
UKSC, has distinctive and invaluable experience of balancing rights in a legal 
system in conflict from his time as a barrister, judge and ultimately Lord Chief 
Justice of Northern Ireland.  
90
 Lord Denning concludes his book The Discipline of Law (Butterworths 1979) 
thus: ‗My plea is simply to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which 
would impede it.‘ 314. 
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fearless advocates and pioneering litigants. If we are to be no mean 
country, we should not imagine that the past of Magna Carta is a foreign 
country, especially at a time when the government is contemplating 
fundamental constitutional reform. The spirit of Runnymede, ―The lissom 
reeds that give and take, That bend so far, but never break‖,91 can still 
speak to the rule of law.
92
 As Kipling‘s poem concludes:      
 
And still when Mob or Monarch lays 
Too rude a hand on English ways, 
The whisper wakes, the shudder plays, 
Across the reeds at Runnymede. 
And Thames, that knows the moods of kings, 
And crowds and priests and suchlike things, 
Rolls deep and dreadful as he brings 
Their warning down from Runnymede
93
 
                                                     
91
 Kipling (n 88), first stanza. 
92
 Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin 2011), especially 10-13. 
93
 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the last stanza as 
arguably a better explanation of the spirit of Magna Carta because it can explain 
the trial of Charles I, on the one hand, and the proper use of the Public Order Act 
1936 and 1986, on the other. This has the merit also of reminding us that Kipling 
is a more subtle and less bourgeois or jingoist poet than, eg, George Orwell 
credits. 
